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SUMMARY OF REPLY
Based on the arguments presented in Ms. Call's brief, the issue on appeal has
largely boiled down to a determination of whether Ms. Call's injuries in 2000 were
simply an additional manifestation of harm from earlier treatment or a new and distinct
injury that was unrelated to the earlier treatment. In her brief, Ms. Call argued: "A. The
December 2000 Surgery and Subsequent Care Related to a New Condition, and Was Not
Merely a Continuation of Prior Treatment." Appellee. Br. at 18. On the other hand, Dr.
Keiter's argument is premised on his contention that the infection and care in December,
2000 was directly related to the earlier treatment he provided in 1995 and 1999and
importantly was directly related to a defective implant.
The evidence in the record, which for the most part is from Ms. Call and her own
expert, Dr. Miner, indicates that the 2000 injury was related to the presence of silicone in
her breast tissue. Dr. Keiter attempted to, but was unable to remove all of the silicone
during the surgery in 1995. Ms. Call was aware that silicone remained in her breast
tissue, and she was aware that the 1999 surgery was to remove a silicone granuloma.
Again during the surgery in 1999, Dr. Keiter saw residual silicone in Ms. Call's breast
tissue, but he was unable to remove it all.
In 2000, the problems caused by residual silicone manifested itself in an infection.
Ms. Call's expert, Dr. Miner, stated that the infection could be traced back to the substandard care in 1995 and was not properly dealt with in the follow up surgery in 1999.
Dr. Miner stated that both the 1999 granuloma and the 2000 infection were the result of
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the residual silicone which Dr. Keiter had failed to remove in 1995. In other words, the
1999 granuloma and the 2000 infection were different symptoms of the same underlying
problem. While Ms. Call admitted that the 1995 and 1999 surgeries were negligent, she
argued that she was only attempting to recover for the care provided after 2000. Utah
law does not allow Ms. Call to split her claim in this manner. The trial court erred when
it only partially granted Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment and allowed Ms. Call
to split her claim in order to avoid the statute of limitations.
In addition, Ms. Call's injuries are all the direct result of the rupture of her silicone
implant. It is undisputed that Dr. Keiter did not cause the rupture or choose to
manufacture an implant filled with silicone. Because the implant ruptured, silicone
invaded Ms. Call's breast tissue, and the jury should have been allowed to apportion fault
to the implant manufacturer. The trial court erred when it did not allow Dr. Keiter to list
the implant manufacturer on the special verdict form.
ARGUMENT
I.

Ms. Call's 2000 infection, like her 1999 granuloma, was created by residual
silicone in her breast cavity.
The trial court erred when it only partially granted Dr. Keiter5s motion for

summary judgment and effectively split Ms. Call's cause of action. Because all of Ms.
Call's injuries stem from the same problem—residual silicone—the trial court erred in
allowing Ms. Call to recover for some of her later injuries while finding the earlier
injuries were time-barred. Moreover, the trial court's err was emphasized by Ms. Call's
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own expert and her own statements which suggested that Dr. Keiter's earlier care was
below the applicable standard of care and set in motion all of her subsequent injuries.
Ms. Call's childhood reconstructive surgery left a scar in her chest. Later, when
Ms. Call had her breast augmentation, Dr. Keiter used the existing scar as the entry point
for her implants in order to avoid further, unnecessary scarring. When the implants
ruptured, Dr. Keiter removed the implants at this same place. Ms. Call required
significant follow up care after the implants were inserted because her skin tissue was
thin as a result of her birth defect. Due to the invasive nature of the reconstructive
surgery, the implant surgery and the required follow up procedures, Ms. Call's skin tissue
was thinner than most patients and more easily susceptible to irritation and infection.
In 1995, Ms. Call's left implant ruptured when she was hugged. The force of this
hug caused silicone to invade her tissue. The silicone used in Ms. Call's implant was a
clear, sticky liquid. After the implant ruptured, the clear silicone was present throughout
the tissue in the breast pocket. Dr. Keiter removed as much silicone as he could;
however, a radical mastectomy was the only procedure which would have allowed him to
remove it all. Even plaintiffs expert, Dr. Robert Miner, admitted it was impossible to
remove all of the silicone. Further, Dr. Miner was not critical of Dr. Keiter's decision to
not perform a full mastectomy.
Both Dr. Keiter and Dr. Miner agree that the presence of silicone irritates the skin
tissue. The irritated skin tissue is more susceptible to infection and attempts to protect
itself by encapsulating the silicone. The encapsulated silicone is a silicone granuloma.
Dr. Miner had two criticisms of Dr. Keiter's care: (1) Dr. Keiter's care fell below the
3

standard of care because he did not attempt to remove as much silicone as was possible,
thereby creating the possibility of granulomas and infection; and (2) given multiple
opportunities, Dr. Keiter repeatedly failed to properly treat the resulting infection that
developed within the breast pocket and tissue due to the presence of residual silicone.
Dr. Miner testified that the infection existed at least as early as 1999, when Dr.
Keiter performed the surgery to remove the granuloma. Furthermore, Dr. Miner was
critical of all of Dr. Keiter's care, dating back to the 1995 surgery. Indeed, his criticisms
were consistent throughout this case and were consistent with Ms. Call's contention that
the 1995 and 1999 treatments were negligent—although she was not attempting to
recover for the early negligence. Dr. Miner's criticisms were unequivocal and
susceptible to only one interpretation; his opinions are set forth below.
Dr. Miner's pre-trial report and deposition testimony
In his report, Dr. Miner states that both the 1995 and 1999 surgeries were below
the standard of care. (R. at 337.) In discussing the 1995 surgery, Dr. Keiter noted the
implant was ruptured, and he focuses on Dr. Keiter's failure to remove the free silicone in
the breast pocket. (R. at 337.) In reference to the 1999 surgery, Dr. Miner notes that Dr.
Keiter removed the granuloma and documented the existence of residual silicone. (R. at
337.) Dr. Miner is again critical of Dr. Keiter's care because he says that Dr. Keiter
made no attempt to remove the residual silicone he observed. (R. at 337.) Finally, Dr.
Miner's report ties the infection to the granuloma, stating: "He knew or should have
known the remaining silicone would form more granulomas. The "ulcer" described on
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the December 18,2000 operative report would be consistent with silicone reaction close
under the skin in an area he himself had previously reported." (R. at 337.)
Consistent with his expert report, Dr. Miner's deposition testimony was similarly
critical of the care provided by Dr. Keiter in 1995, 1999, and 2000. Dr. Miner testified:
"He never cleared up the infection from the time it started in May of, what, '95. He
never really did a good operation to get rid of the silicone. And then when it first became
infected, which wasn't in '95, in '99, he never cleared it up really, from '99 until the very
end." (R. at 340.) Dr. Miner's deposition identified the 1995 surgery as the starting point
and catalyst for everything else. Dr. Miner testified that Dr. Keiter breached the standard
of care in 1995, stating: "Well, the first one would have to with the '95 surgery, because
that was an inadequate treatment to remove free silicone by not doing a
capsulectomy.... So I felt that that surgery was definitely below the standard of care
and really set up everything else for a downfall, because in not getting rid of that silicone,
that led to the silicone granuloma." (R. at 340.)
Dr. Miner's testimony at trial
Although the trial court's ruling precluded Dr. Miner from criticizing the
treatments before 2000, at trial, Ms. Call's theory of the case was that Dr. Keiter was
negligent in treating the infection for which she sought treatment after December 18,
2000. Ms. Call's expert, however, opined that the infection had been present in Ms.
Call's body since the earlier treatments (in 1995 and 1999). Moreover, Dr. Miner
criticized Dr. Keiter's earlier treatment of Ms. Call on multiple occasions, contending
that Dr. Keiter never properly removed or treated the infection.
5

Dr. Miner presented the jury with a "nidus" of infection theory. (R. at 1819: 320.)
According to Dr. Miner, a nidus is a nest and a source for contamination. Dr. Miner
testified that the breast formed a capsule around the implant that became the nidus for the
infection because of the silicone that leaked from the implant. Later, the infection
manifested itself on the surface in the hole where Dr. Keiter had removed the implants
and where Dr. Keiter had testified to thinning the skin during the 1999 surgery. (R. at
1819:323-27,330.)
In expanding on his nidus of infection theory, Dr. Miner repeatedly testified that
the infection was created from the early 1995 and 1999 surgeries. (R. at 1819: 339-42.)
Specifically, Dr. Miner described Ms. Call's infection as being "chronic" and
"smoldering." Dr. Miner analogized the situation to having a pocket full of honey. He
said that if you remove an object from the pocket of honey, wash the honey off, and put it
back into the pocket, then the object will still have honey on it. (R. at 1819: 342.) Dr.
Miner said that Ms. Call's breast had a chronic—and therefore preexisting—infection
that Dr. Keiter never properly treated, but rather, Dr. Keiter would simply take the
implant out, wash it off, and put it back into the infected capsule. (R. at 1819: 342-43.)
In describing this course of treatment, Dr. Miner was criticizing Dr. Keiter's
treatment of Ms. Call both before the cut-off date and after the cut-off date. In fact, Dr.
Miner's criticism of Dr. Keiter's treatment was premised on the fact that he kept treating
Ms. Call in the same manner without curing what Dr. Miner believed was the root of the
problem. (R. at 1819: 343.) Specifically, Dr. Miner testified that Dr. Keiter's treatment
on December 18, 2000 fell below the standard of care because "once he sees this is a
6

recurring problem - and remember this is the third time he's taking out the granuloma in
the same place - a bell has to go off and say, hey, something else is going on." (R. at
1819: 344-45 (emphasis added).) Furthermore, when asked if the treatment on December
18, 2000 was appropriate, Dr. Miner testified:
[I]t's like the analogy with the honey. You're going to get
honey back on it. And that's exactly what it did. The honey
was still there; the bacteria was still there. He hadn't done
anything to that point or after that point that truly rendered
the pocket as sterile as he could get it. And as long as you
keep doing that, like I said, you keep taking the same road,
you keep getting the same result.
(R. at 1819: 346 (emphasis added).)
In summary, Dr. Miner's criticisms of Dr. Keiter all related back to the care he
provided in 1995. In addition, one of his chief criticisms of the care provided in treating
the infection in 2000 was that Dr. Keiter kept doing the same thing without addressing
the root of the problem. Dr. Miner's testimony demonstrated that Ms. Call was splitting
her claims to avoid the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App
165, Tfl4, 185 P.3d 573 (plaintiff cannot split a cause of action to avoid the statute of
limitations); see also Medvedv. Glenn, 2005 UT 77, 125 P.3d 913 (discussing that
present injury along with possibility of future harm triggers statute of limitations when
the present injury occurs under one action rule).
In her brief, Ms. Call argues that Dr. Keiter improperly argued the continuous
negligent treatment rule, essentially in order to knock down a straw man. See Aplee's Br.
at 27. The only reason Dr. Keiter addressed the continuous negligent treatment rule was
7

because it was an argument raised by Ms. Call in opposition to Dr. Keiter's motion for
summary judgment. (R. at 587.) As it appears that Ms. Call is disavowing any ownership
of this argument, Dr. Keiter will not discuss it further.
Given the facts and circumstances, the only remaining issue is when the statute of
limitations would begin to run on Ms. Call's claims. It is undisputed that Ms. Call
learned of the residual silicone in her breast cavity immediately after the 1995 surgery.
In 1999, Ms. Call needed additional surgery to remove a silicone granuloma. Dr. Miner
testified that Ms. Call had an infection by this date, which Dr. Keiter failed to treat. Ms.
Call's expert opined that the granuloma and the infection were both the result of the
residual silicone. Given Ms. Call's knowledge of an injury necessitating surgery and the
possibility it was caused by Dr. Keiter's negligence during the 1995 surgery, the statute
of limitations began to run in 1999 at the latest. At best, Ms. Call may not have
appreciated the full extent of her injury in 1999; however, Ms. Call understood that she
was injured and, under Utah law, this was sufficient to start the statute of limitations. See
Duerden v. Utah Valley Hosp., 663 F. Supp. 781, 783 (D. Utah 1987) (a plaintiff s
subjective belief that injury was temporary side effect was insufficient to toll the running
of the limitations period); Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) (once same
harm is manifested, the limitations period begins to run on all claims—both present and
future). The trial court erred when it allowed Ms. Call to split and pursue her related
claims.
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II.

Assuming Ms. Call is correct that her infection in 2000 was new, the trial
court erred in allowing in Dr. Miner's opinion that the earlier treatment was
the source of the infection.
The evidence relating to all of Dr. Keiter's treatment in 1995 and 1999 is

irrelevant under Ms. CalPs theory of the case. Ms. Call argued that she needed the ability
to discuss the early treatment in a neutral manner in order to give the jury the required
background. Although Dr. Keiter had reservations about this evidence, Dr. Keiter did not
object to the background evidence so long as it was presented without opinion and in an
objective manner. (R. at 739-42; 1816: 3-5). When the evidence was presented, however,
it was anything but neutral and innocuous background information.
Dr. Miner was allowed to criticize Dr. Keiter's care and to offer opinion which
established a chronic pattern of sub-standard care. This evidence confused and inflamed
the jury. If the injury was truly new as Ms. Call advocates, the prior treatment lacked
probative value. By allowing the evidence in at trial, the jury heard Dr. Miner's version
of events. Dr. Miner modified his earlier criticisms of Dr. Keiter into his nidus theory.
In this way, Dr. Miner's trial testimony differed from his report and deposition, and it
violated the trial court's ruling. The jury was then instructed to ignore this inflammatory
evidence when it came time to award damages. The trial court's decision on this issue
was prejudicial error and requires a new trial.
III.

Notwithstanding the trial court's decision to not list the manufacturer on the
verdict form, the jury heard sufficient evidence on which it could have
apportioned fault to the implant manufacturer.
The jury heard plenty of evidence to justify apportioning fault to the implant

manufacturer. The jury heard that the implant ruptured in 1995, allowing silicone to
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release into Ms. Call's breast cavity. Both experts agreed that it is impossible to clean
out all of the silicone after a rupture. Both experts agreed that silicone in the breast
cavity causes problems because it irritates the tissue. These problems include the
creation of silicone granulomas and infection of the inflamed tissue. Ms. Call required
additional treatment and surgeries to remove the granulomas and to treat her infection. In
fact, Ms. Call's only injuries were granulomas and infection. Accordingly, the jury heard
that it was impossible for Dr. Keiter to remove all of the silicone, and the silicone was the
cause of the very injuries for which Ms. Call was seeking damages. Moreover, the jury
heard evidence that Ms. Call had sued and recovered from the implant manufacturer.
Thus, the trial court erred when it did not allow the jury to apportion fault to the implant
manufacturer based on Ms. Call's silicone related injuries.

10

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, this Court has several different options. This Court can
reverse the trial court's grant of partially summary judgment and direct the trial court to
grant the motion in full. This Court can reverse the trial court on either its decision to
admit in prejudicial and irrelevant information or on its decision to not allow Dr. Keiter
to list the implant manufacturer on the special verdict form. In either of these instances,
this Court would reverse and remand for a new trial.
DATED this ^S

day of October, 2009.
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CHARY E. PETERSON
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Attorney for Appellant
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